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ABSTRACT
In recent years, smart contracts have suffered major exploits, cost-
ing millions of dollars. Unlike traditional programs, smart contracts
are deployed on a blockchain. As such, they cannot be modified
once deployed. Though various tools have been proposed to detect
vulnerable smart contracts, the majority fails to protect vulnera-
ble contracts that have already been deployed on the blockchain.
Only very few solutions have been proposed so far to tackle the
issue of post-deployment. However, these solutions suffer from low
precision and are not generic enough to prevent any type of attack.
In this work, we introduceÆGIS, a dynamic analysis tool that
protects smart contracts from being exploited during runtime. Its
capability of detecting new vulnerabilities can easily be extended
through so-called attack patterns. These patterns are written in a
domain-specific language that is tailored to the execution model of
Ethereum smart contracts. The language enables the description of
malicious control and data flows. In addition, we propose a novel
mechanism to streamline and speed up the process of managing
attack patterns. Patterns are voted upon and stored via a smart
contract, thus leveraging the benefits of tamper-resistance and
transparency provided by the blockchain. We compare ÆGIS to
current state-of-the-art tools and demonstrate that our solution
achieves higher precision in detecting attacks. Finally, we perform
a large-scale analysis on the first 4.5 million blocks of the Ethereum
blockchain, thereby confirming the occurrences of well reported
and yet unreported attacks in the wild.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain has evolved greatly since its first introduction in 2009
[25]. A blockchain is essentially a verifiable, append-only list of
records in which all transactions are recorded in batches of so-called
blocks. Each block is linked to a previous block via a cryptographic
hash. This linked list of blocks is maintained by a decentralised
peer-to-peer network. The peers in this network follow a consensus
protocol that dictates which peer is allowed to append the next
block. By introducing the concept of smart contracts, Ethereum [41]
revolutionized the way digital assets are traded. As smart contracts
govern more and more valuable assets, the contracts themselves
have come under attack from hackers.
Smart contracts are programs that are stored and executed across
blockchain peers. They are deployed and invoked via transactions.
Deployed smart contracts are immutable, thus any bugs present
during deployment [2], or as a result of changes to the blockchain
protocol [7], can make a smart contract vulnerable. Moreover, since
contract owners are anonymous, responsible disclosure is usually
infeasible or very hard in practice. Though smart contracts can be
implemented with upgradeability and destroyability in mind, this is
not compulsory. As a matter of fact, Ethereum already faced several
devastating attacks on vulnerable smart contracts.
In 2016, an attacker exploited a reentrancy bug in a crowdfund-
ing smart contract known as the DAO. The attacker exploited the
capability of recursively calling a payout function contained in the
contract. The attacker managed to drain over $150 million [32]
worth of cryptocurrency from the smart contract. The DAO hack
was a poignant demonstration of the impact that insecure smart
contracts can have. The Ethereum market cap value dropped from
over $1.6 billion before the attack, to values below $1 billion after
the attack, in less than a day. Another example happened with the
planned Constantinople hard fork in January 2019. Ethereum was
scheduled to receive an update intended to introduce a cheaper
gas cost for certain smart contract operations. On the eve of the
hard fork, a new reentrancy issue caused by this update was de-
tected. It turned out that the reduction of gas costs also enabled
reentrancy attacks on smart contracts that were previously secure.
This resulted in the update being delayed [7]. A third example is
the Parity wallet hack. In 2017, the Parity wallet smart contract was
attacked twice due to a bug in the access control logic. The bug
allowed anyone to claim ownership of the smart contract and to
take control of all the funds. The first attack resulted in over $30
million being stolen [44], whereas the second attack resulted in
roughly $155 million being locked forever [29].
The manner in which these issues are currently handled is not
ideal. At the moment, whenever a major vulnerability is detected by
the Ethereum community, it can take several days or weeks for the
community to issue a critical update and even longer for all nodes to
adopt this update. Such a delay extends the window for exploitation
and can have dire effects on the trading value of the underlying
cryptocurrency. Moreover, the lack of a standardised procedure to
deal with vulnerable smart contracts, has led to a “Wild West”-like
situation where several self-appointed white hats started attacking
smart contracts in order to protect the funds that are at risk from
other malicious attackers [4]. However, in some cases the effects of
attacks can cause a split in the community so contentious that it
leads to a hard fork, such as in the case of the DAO hack which led
to the birth of the Ethereum classic blockchain [32].
Academia has proposed a plethora of different tools that al-
low users to scan smart contracts for vulnerabilities prior to de-
ploying them on the blockchain or interacting with them (see
e.g. [21, 23, 36, 38]). However, by design these tools cannot protect
vulnerable contracts that have already been deployed. Grossman et
al. [12] are the first to present ECFChecker, a tool that allows to
dynamically check executed transactions for reentrancy. However,
ECFChecker does not prevent reentrancy attacks. In order to pro-
tect already deployed contracts, Rodler et al. [31] propose Sereum,
a modified Ethereum client that detects and reverts1 transactions
that trigger reentrancy attacks. Sereum leverages the principle that
every exploit is performed via a transaction. Unfortunately, Sereum
has three major drawbacks. First, it requires the client to be modi-
fied whenever a new type of vulnerability is found. Second, not only
the tool itself, but also any updates to it must be manually adopted
by the majority of nodes for its security provisions to become ef-
fective. Third, their detection technique can only detect reentrancy
attacks, despite there being many other types of attacks [2].
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce a novel domain-specific language, which en-
ables the description of so-called attack patterns. These pat-
terns reflect malicious control and data flows that occur
during execution of malicious transactions.
• We presentÆGIS, a tool that reverts malicious transactions
in real-time using attack patterns, thereby preventing attacks
on deployed smart contracts.
• We propose a novel way to quickly propagate security up-
dates without relying on client-side update mechanisms, by
making use of a smart contract to store and vote upon new
attack patterns. Storing patterns in a smart contract ensures
integrity, decentralizes security updates and provides full
transparency on the proposed patterns.
• We illustrate the effectiveness by providing patterns to pre-
vent the two most prominent hacks in Ethereum, the DAO
and Parity wallet hacks.
• Finally, we provide a detailed comparison to current state-
of-the-art runtime detection tools and perform a large-scale
analysis on 4.5 million blocks. The results demonstrate that
ÆGIS achieves better precision than current state-of-the-art
tools.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the necessary background for under-
standing the setting of our work. We describe the Ethereum block-
chain and its capability of executing smart contracts. We focus on
Ethereum since it is currently the most prominent blockchain plat-
form when it comes to smart contract deployment. Finally, we also
1Consuming gas, without letting the transaction affect the state of the blockchain.
provide background information on the two most prominent smart
contract vulnerabilities, namely, reentrancy and access control.
2.1 Ethereum and Smart Contracts
Ethereum. The Ethereum blockchain is a decentralized public
ledger that is maintained by a network of nodes that distrust one
another. Every node runs one of several existing Ethereum clients.
The clients can operate with different configurations. For instance,
nodes who are configured to mine blocks are called miners. Miners
execute transactions, include them in blocks and append them
to the blockchain. They compete to create a block by solving a
cryptographic puzzle. Once they succeed, the block is proposed to
the network. Other miners verify the new block and either accept
or reject it. A miner whose block is included in the blockchain
is rewarded with a block reward and the execution fees from the
included transactions.
Transactions. Transactions are used to modify state in Ethereum.
As such, they allow users to transfer ether (Ethereum’s cryptocur-
rency), and to create smart contracts or trigger their execution.
Transactions are created using an account. There are two types of
accounts in Ethereum, user accounts and contract accounts. Trans-
actions are given a certain amount of gas to execute, called the gas
limit. Gas is a unit which is used to measure the use of comput-
ing resources. Gas can be converted to ether through the so-called
gas price of a transaction. Gas limit and gas price can be chosen
by the creator of the transaction. Together they determine the fee
that the user is willing to pay for the inclusion of their transaction
into the blockchain. Moreover, transactions also contain a desti-
nation address. It identifies the recipient of the transaction, and it
can be either a user account or a smart contract. Transactions can
also carry value that is transferred to the recipient. Once created,
transactions are broadcast to the network. Miners then execute
the transactions and include them into blocks. Smart contracts (i.e.
contract accounts) are created by leaving the destination address
of a transaction empty. The bytecode that is provided within the
transaction is then copied into the blockchain and it is given a
unique address that identifies the smart contract.
Smart Contracts. Smart contracts are fully-fledged programs that
are stored and executed across the blockchain. They are devel-
oped using a dedicated high-level programming language that com-
piles into low-level bytecode. This bytecode gets interpreted by
the Ethereum Virtual Machine. Smart contracts contain functions
that can be triggered via transactions. The name of the function
as well as the data to be executed is included in the data field of
the transaction. A default function or so-called fallback function is
executed whenever the provided function name is not recognized
by the smart contract. Moreover, smart contracts can initiate calls
to other smart contracts. Thus, a single transaction may interact
with several smart contracts that call one another. By default smart
contracts cannot be destroyed or updated. It is the task of the de-
veloper to implement these capabilities before deploying the smart
contract. Unfortunately, many smart contracts are released without
destroyability or upgradeability in mind. As a result, many con-
tracts remain vulnerable or active on the blockchain even past their
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1 contract A { // Victim contract
2 ...
3 function withdraw () public {
4 if (credit[msg.sender ]) {
5 msg.sender.call.value(credit[msg.sender ])();
6 credit[msg.sender] = 0;
7 }
8 }
9
10 contract B { // Exploiting contract
11 ...
12 function () public payable {
13 A.withdraw ();
14 }
15 }
Figure 1: Example of a reentrancy vulnerability.
utility. As mentioned earlier, once deployed, smart contracts are
immutable, they cannot be modified and bugs cannot be fixed. Thus,
it is not possible to update a smart contract in the later run.
EVM. The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is a purely stack-
based, register-less virtual machine that supports a Turing-complete
instruction set of opcodes. These opcodes allow smart contracts to
perform memory operations and interact with the blockchain, such
as retrieving specific information (e.g., the current block number).
Ethereum makes use of gas to make sure that contracts terminate
and to prevent denial-of-service attacks. It assigns a gas cost to the
execution of an opcode. The execution of a smart contract results in
the modification of its state. The latter is stored on the blockchain
and consists of a balance and a storage. The balance represents the
amount of ether currently owned by the smart contract. The storage
is organized as a key-value store and allows the smart contract to
store values and keep state across executions. During execution,
the EVM holds a machine state µ = (д,pc,m, i, s), where д is the
gas available, pc is the program counter,m represents the memory
contents, i is the active number of words in memory and s is the
content of the stack. In summary, the EVM is a transaction-based
state machine that updates a smart contract based on transaction
input data and the smart contract’s bytecode.
2.2 Smart Contract Vulnerabilities
Although, a number of smart contract vulnerabilities exist [2], in
this work, we primarily focus on two types of vulnerabilities that
have been defined by the NCC Group as the top two vulnerabilities
in their Decentralized Application Security Project [13]: reentrancy
and access control.
Reentrancy Vulnerabilities. Reentrancy occurs whenever a con-
tract calls another contract, which then calls back into the original
contract, thereby creating a reentrant call. This is not an issue as
long as all the state updates that depend on the call from the original
contract are performed before the call. In other words, reentrancy
only becomes problematic when a contract updates its state after
calling another contract. A malicious contract can take advantage of
this by recursively calling a contract until all the funds are drained.
Figure 1 provides an example of a malicious reentrancy. Contract
B contains a fallback function (line 12-14), a default function that
is automatically executed when no other function is called. In this
example, the fallback function of contract B calls the withdraw
function of contract A. Assuming that contract B already deposited
some ether in contractA, contractA now calls contract B to transfer
back its deposited ether. However, the transfer results in calling
the fallback function of contract B once again, which results in
reentering contract A and once more transferring the value of the
deposited ether to contract B. This repeats until the balance of
contract A becomes zero or the execution runs out of gas.
Reentrancy vulnerabilities were extensively studied by Rodler
et al. [31], and can be divided into four distinct categories: same-
function reentrancy, cross-function reentrancy, delegated reentrancy
and create-based reentrancy. Same-function reentrancy occurswhen-
ever an attacker reenters the original contract via the same func-
tion (see Figure 1). Cross-function reentrancy builds on the same-
function reentrancy. However, here the attacker takes advantage
of another function that shares a state with the original func-
tion. Delegated reentrancy and create-based reentrancy are similar
to same-function reentrancy, but use different opcodes to initi-
ate the call. Specifically, delegated reentrancy can occur using ei-
ther the DELEGATECALL or CALLCODE opcodes, while create-based
reentrancy only occurs when using the CREATE opcode. While the
DELEGATECALL and CALLCODE opcodes behave roughly similar to
the CALL opcode, the CREATE opcode causes a new contract to be
created and the contract constructor to be executed. This newly
created contract can then call and reenter the original contract.
Access Control Vulnerabilities.Access control vulnerabilities re-
sult from incorrectly enforced user access control policies in smart
contracts. Such vulnerabilities allow attackers to gain access to
privileged contract functions that would normally not be available
to them. The most famous examples of this type of vulnerability
are the two Parity MultiSig-Wallet hacks [29, 44]. The issue origi-
nates from the fact that the developers of the Parity wallet decided
to split some of the contract logic into a separate smart contract
named WalletLibrary. This had the advantage of reusing parts of
the code for multiple wallets allowing users to save on gas costs
during deployment. A simplified version of the code can be seen in
Figure 2. As can be seen in line 17-20, the initialisation of the wallet
is performed via the initWallet function located in contract L,
which is called by the constructor of contractW . In addition, any
unmatched function calls to contractW are caught by the fallback
function in line 6-8, which redirects the call to contract L by means
of the DELEGATECALL operation. Unfortunately, in the first version
of the Parity MultiSig-Wallet, the developers forgot to write a safety
check for the initWallet function, ensuring that the function can
only be called once. As a result an attacker was able to gain own-
ership of contractW by calling the initWallet function via the
fallback function. Once in control the attacker withdrew all the
funds by invoking the execute function (line 32-34).
After the first Parity hack, a new Parity MultiSig-Wallet Library
contract was deployed addressing the issue above. In the newly
deployed version, the initWallet function was not part of the con-
structor anymore, but had to be called separately after deployment.
However, the developers did not call the initWallet function after
deployment. Hence, contract L remained uninitialised, meaning that
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1 contract W { // Wallet contract
2 ...
3 function W(address _owner) { // Contructor
4 L.delegatecall("initWallet(address)", _owner);
5 }
6 function () payable {
7 L.delegatecall(msg.data);
8 }
9 }
10
11 contract L { // Library contract
12 ...
13 modifier onlyOwner {
14 if (m_ownerIndex[msg.sender] > 0) _;
15 }
16 ...
17 function initWallet(address [] _owners , uint
_required , uint _daylimit) {
18 initDaylimit(_daylimit);
19 initMultiowned(_owners , _required);
20 }
21 function initMultiowned(address [] _owners , uint
_required) {
22 ...
23 for (uint i = 0; i < _owners.length; ++i) {
24 ...
25 m_ownerIndex[_owners[i]] = 2+i;
26 }
27 ...
28 }
29 function execute(address _to , uint _value , bytes
_data) onlyOwner {
30 _to.call.value(_value)(_data));
31 }
32 function kill(address _to) onlyOwner {
33 suicide(_to);
34 }
35 }
Figure 2: Example of an access control vulnerability.
the library contract itself had no owners. As a result, 3 months after
deployment a user known as devops199 was experimenting with
the previous Parity hack vulnerability and called the initWallet
function directly inside contract L, marking its address as the owner.
The user then called the kill function (line 32-34), which removed
the executable code of contract L from the blockchain2 and sent the
remaining funds to the new owner. The contract itself contained no
funds, however it was used by multiple Parity wallets which had
the address of contract L defined as a constant in their executable
code. As a result any wallet trying to use contract L as a library
would now receive zero as return value, effectively rendering the
wallet unusable and therefore freezing the funds contained in the
wallets. This led the user to publicly disclose the steps that led to
this tragedy, with the words: “I accidentally killed it.” [9].
3 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss some of the works that are most closely
related to ours.
2The contract code is technically not removed from the blockchain, however, the
contract’s code can no longer be executed on the blockchain, because the contract has
been marked as killed.
Security Analysis of Smart Contracts. As with any program,
smart contracts may contain bugs and can be vulnerable to ex-
ploitation. As discussed in [2], different types of vulnerabilities
exist, often leading to financial losses. The issue is made worse by
the fact that smart contracts are immutable. Once deployed, they
cannot be altered and vulnerabilities cannot be fixed. In addition to
that, automated tools for launching attacks exist [21].
Several defense mechanisms have been proposed to detect se-
curity vulnerabilities in smart contracts. This includes tools such
as Erays [46], designed to provide smart contract auditors with
a reverse engineered pseudo code of a contract from its bytecode.
The interpretation of the pseudo code however remains a slow
and gruelling task. More automated tools have also been proposed
benefiting from regular expressions [43] and machine learning
techniques [34] to detect vulnerabilities.
A wealth of security research has focused on the creation of
static analysis tools to automatically detect vulnerabilities in smart
contracts. Formal verification has been used together with a formal
definition of the EVM [1, 16], or by first converting smart con-
tracts into the formal language F* [5, 11]. Other works focused
on analysing the higher level solidity code [10, 35], which limits
the scope to those contracts with available source code. Another
approach is to apply static analysis on the smart contract bytecode
[38]. A technique commonly used for this purpose is symbolic exe-
cution, designed to thoroughly explore the state space of a smart
contract utilising constraint solving. It has been used to detect con-
tracts with vulnerabilities [23, 28], to find misbehaving contracts
[20, 26, 37], or detect integer bugs [19, 36]. Fuzzing techniques have
also been applied [15, 18]. In [42] the authors propose Harvey,
a greybox fuzzer that selects appropriate inputs and transaction
sequences to increase code coverage. Fuzzing techniques however
involve a trade-off between the number of discovered paths and
the efficiency in input generation.
While all the listed tools help identify vulnerabilities, they can-
not protect already deployed smart contracts from being exploited.
Therefore, to deal with the issue of vulnerabilities in deployed smart
contracts, [12, 31] propose a modification to the Ethereum client,
that would allow detection and prevent exploitation of reentrancy
vulnerabilities at runtime. However, these approaches only deal
with reentrancy and require all the clients in the network to be mod-
ified. This is an issue for the following reasons. On one hand, every
update of the vulnerability detection software requires an update of
the different Ethereum client implementations. This is true for both
bug fixes and functionality upgrades, for example the detection of
new vulnerabilities. On the other hand, every modification of the
clients needs to be adopted by all the nodes participating in the
Ethereum blockchain. This requires time and breaks compatibility
between updated and non-updated clients. In this work, we propose
a generic solution that protects contracts and users from existing
and future vulnerabilities, without requiring client modifications
and forks every time a new vulnerable smart contract is found.
Wang et al. [40] propose an approach to detect vulnerabilities
at runtime based on two invariants that follow the intuition that
most vulnerabilities are due to a mismatch between the transferred
amount and the amount reflected by the contract’s internal book-
keeping logic. However, this approach has three main drawbacks.
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First, it requires the automated and correct identification of book-
keeping variables, which besides being a non-trivial task also does
not hold for every contract, since there can be contracts that do
not use internal bookkeeping logic but are nevertheless vulnerable.
Second, their approach does not model environmental information
such as timestamps or block numbers, which does not allow them to
detect vulnerabilities such as timestamp dependence or transaction
order dependency, whereas our approach models environmental
information and allows for the detection of these vulnerabilities.
Finally, Wang et al.’s approach can only detect violations of safety
properties and not violations of liveness properties such as the
Parity Wallet Hack 2. In this work, we demonstrate that our ap-
proach is capable of detecting both Parity wallet hacks and therefore
violations to safety as well as liveness properties.
Blockchain-Based Voting. Since blockchains provide the means
for transparency and decentralization, multiple blockchain-based
solutions have been proposed for performing electronic voting [3,
17, 27]. Interestingly, with the recent developments in quantum
computers, recent work also has started to focus on the development
of quantum-resistant blockchain-based voting schemes [33]. These
solutions can all be categorised into two categories: cryptocurrency-
based and smart-contract-based.
Cryptocurrency-based solutions focus on using payments as
a proxy for votes in an election. When a voter wishes to cast a
vote, he or she makes a payment to the address of the candidate.
Lee et al. [22] proposed such a system in the Bitcoin network.
However, their system requires a trusted third party to perform the
ballot counting. Zao et al. [45] were the first to propose a voting
scheme using the public Bitcoin network while preserving the
privacy of the votes. Another well-known cryptocurrency-based
solution is CarbonVote [8]. It was introduced in the aftermath of
the DAO hack to allow the Ethereum Foundation to determine if
the Ethereum community wanted a hard fork or not. The tallying
was performed by counting the amount of ether that each address
received. Needless to say, such a system gives a tremendous amount
of voting power to users with a large amount of funds.
Smart-contract-based voting relies on a decentralized application
to assist the voting process – there is no central entity. McCorry et
al. [24] propose a practical implementation of the Open Vote Net-
work [14] in the form of a smart contract deployed on the Ethereum
blockchain for boardroom voting. Their implementation is self-
tallying and provides, in addition to vote privacy, also transparency.
Voting proceeds in several rounds, where the voters first broadcast
their voting key, followed by a proof that their vote is binary (a
“yes” or “no” vote). A final tally round allows anyone to calculate
the total sum of votes, without revealing individual ballots. The
voting mechanism described in this paper is inspired by McCorry
et al.’s proposed solution and implementation. The limitations of
their proposed solution, namely having a binary voting system
and limiting the number of voters to less than 50 participants, are
acceptable for our purposes.
4 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present the details of our solution towards
a generic and decentralized way to prevent any type of attacks
on already deployed smart contracts. Our idea is to bundle every
Ethereum client with a runtime analysis tool, that interacts with the
EVM and is capable of interpreting so-called attack patterns, and
reverting transactions that match these patterns. Attack patterns
are described using our domain-specific language (DSL), which
is tailored to the execution model of the EVM and which allows
to easily describe malicious control and data flows. The fact that
we shift the capability of detecting attacks from the client-side im-
plementation to the DSL, gives us the advantage of being able to
quickly propose mitigations against new vulnerabilities, without
having to modify the Ethereum client. Existing approaches, such
as Sereum for example, require the client-side implementation to
be modified whenever a new vulnerability is found.
4.1 Generic Attack Detection
Attacks are detected in our system through the use of patterns,
which are described using our DSL. The DSL allows for the defini-
tion of malicious events that occur during the execution of EVM
instructions. The syntax of our DSL is defined by the following BNF
grammar:
⟨instr⟩ ::= CALL | CALLDATALOAD | SSTORE | JUMPI | . . .
⟨exec⟩ ::= depth | pc | address | stack(int) | stack.result |
| memory(int, int) | transaction.⟨trans⟩
| block.⟨block⟩
⟨trans⟩ ::= hash | value | from | to | . . .
⟨block⟩ ::= number | gasUsed | gasLimit | . . .
⟨comp⟩ ::= < | > | ≤ | ≥ | = | , | + | - | · | /
⟨expr⟩ ::= (src.⟨exec⟩ ⟨comp⟩ ⟨expr⟩) [∧ ⟨expr⟩]
| (⟨expr⟩ ⟨comp⟩ dst.⟨exec⟩) [∧ ⟨expr⟩]
| (src.⟨exec⟩ ⟨comp⟩ src.⟨exec⟩) [∧ ⟨expr⟩]
| (src.⟨exec⟩ ⟨comp⟩ dst.⟨exec⟩) [∧ ⟨expr⟩]
| (dst.⟨exec⟩ ⟨comp⟩ dst.⟨exec⟩) [∧ ⟨expr⟩]
| (src.⟨exec⟩ ⟨comp⟩ int) | (dst.⟨exec⟩ ⟨comp⟩ int)
⟨rel⟩ ::= ⇒ |{ |→
⟨pattern⟩ ::= (opcode = ⟨instr⟩) ⟨rel⟩ (opcode = ⟨instr⟩) [where
⟨expr⟩]
| ⟨pattern⟩ ⟨rel⟩ (opcode = ⟨instr⟩) [where ⟨expr⟩]
| (opcode = ⟨instr⟩) ⟨rel⟩ ⟨pattern⟩ [where ⟨expr⟩]
Figure 3: DSL for describing attack patterns.
A pattern is a sequence of relations between EVM instructions
that may occur at runtime. We distinguish between three types of
relations, a “control flow” relation (⇒), a “data flow” relation ({),
and a “follows” relation (→). A control flow relation means that an
instruction is control dependent on another instruction. A data-flow
relation means that an instruction is data dependent on another
instruction. A follows relation means that an instruction is executed
after another instruction, without necessarily being control or data
dependent on the other instruction. A relation is always between
two EVM opcodes: a source opcode (src) and a destination opcode
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CALL
CALL…
…
A.withdraw()
msg.sender.call.
value(…)()
CALL
CALL…
…
A.withdraw()
SSTORE …
credit[msg.sender] = 0
…
⟹
msg.sender.call.
value(…)()
…
…
SSTORE⟹ …credit[msg.sender] = 0…
…
address = B
depth = 1
⟹
address = A
depth = 2
address = B
depth = 3
address = A
depth = 4
address = …
depth = n
⟹ ⟹ ⟹
⟹ ⟹
pc = 272
stack = [𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑎, …] pc = 937stack = [𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑎, …] pc = 272stack = [𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑎, …] pc = 937stack = [𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑎, …] pc = 8555stack = [𝑖, 𝑣, …] pc = 8555stack = [𝑖, 𝑣, …]
Figure 4: Execution example of a reentrancy attack, where the stack values д (gas), t (to), a (amount), i (index) and v (value)
represent the respective parameters passed to the instructions during execution. A control flow relation is depicted using⇒,
while→ depicts a follows relation.
(dst). The source marks the beginning of the relation, whereas
the destination defines the end of the relation. Moreover, the DSL
allows to create conjunctions of expressions that allow to compare
the execution environment between source and destination. The
execution environment includes the current depth of the call stack
(depth), the current value of the program counter (pc), the address
of the contract that is currently being executed (address), the
current values on the stack (stack) as well as the result of an
operation that is pushed onto the stack (stack.result), the current
values stored in memory (memory), and finally, properties of the
current transaction that is being executed (e.g. hash) as well as
properties of the current block that is being executed (e.g. number).
The stack is addressable via an integer, where 0 defines the top
element on the stack. The memory is addressable via two integers:
an offset and a size. In the following, we explain the semantics of our
DSL via two concrete examples of attack patterns: same-function
reentrancy and the parity wallet hack 1.
Same-Function Reentrancy. Reconsider the reentrancy example
that was described in Section 2.2. Figure 4, illustrates the control
flow as well as the follows relations that occur during the execution
of that example. The execution starts with contract address B and
a call stack depth of 1. Eventually, contract B calls the withdraw
function of contract A, which results in executing the CALL instruc-
tion and increasing the depth of the call stack to 2, and switching
the address of the contract that is being executed to contract A.
Next, contract A sends some funds to contract B, which also results
in executing the CALL instruction and increasing the depth of the
call stack to 3, and switching the address of the contract that is
being executed back to contract B. As a result, the fallback func-
tion of contract B is called, which in turn calls again the withdraw
function of contract A. This sequence of calls repeats until the bal-
ance of contract A is either empty or the execution runs out of
gas. Eventually, the state in contract A is updated by executing the
SSTORE instruction. Given these observations, we can now create
the following attack pattern in order to detect and thereby prevent
same-function reentrancy:
( opcode = CALL ) ⇒ ( opcode = CALL ) where
( s r c . s t a c k ( 1 ) = d s t . s t a c k ( 1 ) ) ∧
( s r c . a dd r e s s = d s t . a dd r e s s ) ∧
( s r c . pc = d s t . pc ) →
( opcode = SSTORE ) → ( opcode = SSTORE ) where
( s r c . s t a c k ( 0 ) = d s t . s t a c k ( 0 ) ) ∧
( s r c . a dd r e s s = d s t . a dd r e s s ) ∧
( s r c . depth > d s t . depth )
This attack pattern evaluates to true if a transaction meets the
following two conditions:
(1) there is a control flow relation between two CALL instruc-
tions, where both instructions share the same call destination
(i.e. src. stack(1) = dst.stack(1)), are executed by the
same contract (i.e. src.address = dst.address) and share
the same program counter (i.e. src.pc = dst.pc);
(2) two SSTORE instructions follow the previous control flow
relation, where both instructions write to the same storage
location (i.e. src.stack(0) = dst.stack(0)), are executed
by the same contract (i.e. src.address = dst.address) and
where the first instruction has a higher call stack depth than
the second instruction (i.e. src.depth > dst.depth).
It is worth mentioning that we compare the program counter values
of the two CALL instructions in order to make sure that it is the
same function that is being called, as our goal is to detect only
same-function reentrancy.
Parity Wallet Hack 1. Reconsider the access control example de-
scribed in Section 2.2. Figure 5 illustrates the relevant control flow,
data flow and follows relations that occur during the execution
of that example. We note that the execution example is divided
into two separate transactions. In the first transaction, the attacker
sets itself as the owner, whereas in the second transaction the
attacker transfers all the funds to itself. Although in reality an at-
tacker performs two separate transactions, in our methodology, the
two transactions are represented as a single sequence of execution
events. For both transactions, the execution starts with contract
addressW eventually making a delegate call to contract address L,
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DELEGATECALL
CALLDATACOPY…
…
L.delegatecall(msg.data)
m_ownerIndex[_owners[i]] = 2+i;⟹ …address = Wdepth = 1address = L
depth = 2 ⟹⤳ SSTORE ⤳ JUMPI CALLDATALOAD CALLif (m_ownerIndex[msg.sender] > 0) ⤳_to.call.value(_value)(_data));… … … … … … … …
pc = 284
stack = […]
pc = 1072
stack = […]
pc = 4046
stack = […]
pc = 2701
stack = […]
pc = 725
stack = […]
pc = 2868
stack = [𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑎, …]
transaction hash = 0x9dbf03…ef75ec transaction hash = 0xeef10f…a7be7c
Figure 5: Execution example of an attack on an access control vulnerability. A data flow relation is depicted with {. The
variables g, t and a are as discussed in Figure 4.
as part of the attacker calling the fallback function of contractW . In
the first transaction, we see that at a certain point contract L copies
data from the transaction using the CALLDATACOPY instruction and
stores it into storage via the SSTORE instruction. An interesting
observation here is that state is shared across transactions through
storage. In the second transaction, the data that has previously been
stored is now loaded onto the stack and used by a comparison. A
comparison is ultimately reflected via the JUMPI instruction. Finally,
we see that the comparison follows a CALLDATALOAD instruction
whose data is used by a call CALL instruction. Given these obser-
vations, we are now able to create the following attack pattern in
order to detect and thereby prevent the first Parity wallet hack:
( opcode = DELEGATECALL ) ⇒ ( opcode = CALLDATACOPY) {
( opcode = SSTORE ) { ( opcode = JUMPI ) where
( s r c . t r a n s a c t i o n . hash , d s t . t r a n s a c t i o n . hash ) →
( ( opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { ( opcode = CALL ) ) where
( d s t . s t a c k ( 2 ) > 0 )
The above attack pattern evaluates to true if the following two
conditions are met:
(1) there is a transaction with a control flow relation between a
DELEGATECALL instruction and a CALLDATACOPY instruction,
where the data of the CALLDATACOPY instruction flows into
an SSTORE instruction;
(2) there is another transaction (i.e. src.transaction.hash ,
dst.transaction.hash) where the data that has been previ-
ously stored via the SSTORE instruction flows into a JUMPI
instruction and is followed by a CALLDATALOAD instruction
whose data flows into a CALL instruction that sends out funds
(i.e. dst.stack(2) > 0).
It is worth noting that the Paritywallet attack is amulti-transactional
attack and that it is therefore significantly different from a reen-
trancy attack, that is solely based on a single transaction. For more
examples of attack patterns, please refer to Table 5 in Appendix A.
4.2 Decentralized Security Updates
While our approach of using a DSL allows us to have a generic
solution for detecting attacks, it still leaves two open questions:
(1) How do we distribute and enforce the same patterns across
all the clients?
Figure 6: An illustrative example of ÆGIS’s workflow: step
1) A benign user detects a vulnerability and proposes a pat-
tern (written using our DSL) to the smart contract. Step 2)
Eligible voters vote to either accept or reject the pattern. If
the majority votes to accept the pattern, then all the clients
are updated and the pattern is activated. Step 3) An attacker
tries but fails to exploit a vulnerable smart contract due to
the voted pattern matching the malicious transaction.
(2) How do we decentralize the governance of patterns in order
to prevent a single entity from deciding which patterns are
added or removed?
The answer to these questions is to use a smart contract that is
deployed on the blockchain itself. This solves the problem of dis-
tributing and enforcing that the same patterns are always used
across all clients. Specifically, patterns are stored inside the smart
contract and the blockchain protocol itself guarantees that every
client knows about the exact same state and therefore has access
to exactly the same patterns. The second problem of decentralizing
the governance of patterns, is solved by allowing the proposal and
voting of patterns via the smart contract as depicted in Figure 6.
The contract maintains a list of eligible voters that vote for either
accepting or rejecting a new pattern. If the majority has voted with
“yes”, i.e. to accept the pattern, then it is added to the list of active
patterns. In that case, every client is automatically notified through
the mechanism of smart contract events, and retrieves the updated
list of patterns from the blockchain. In other words, if a pattern
is accepted by the voting mechanism, it is updated across all the
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Figure 7: Architecture of ÆGIS. The dark gray boxes repre-
sentÆGIS’s main components.
clients through the existing consensus mechanism of the Ethereum
blockchain. However, solving the second problem using a voting
mechanism opens up a new problem concerning the requirements
needed for governing the votes. In voting literature, verifiability
and privacy are typically seen as key requirements. Verifiability
concerns linking the output to the input in a verifiable way. Privacy
concerns whether a vote can be linked back to a voter. In addition,
we argue that the situation here is more akin to boardroom voting
than to general elections, because it should be possible to hold vot-
ers accountable. This means that privacy must be maintained only
until the election is over. Finally, the voting system must not be
favorable to any voters – e.g., it should not confer an advantage to
voters that cast their vote late. This final property is called fairness.
It is worth noting that fairness requires privacy during the voting
phase. This leads to the following three requirements:
(1) Verifiability: The outcome of the vote must be verifiably
related to the votes as cast by the voters;
(2) Accountability: Voters can be held accountable for how
they voted;
(3) Fairness: No intermediate information must be leaked.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we provide the implementation details of our solu-
tion calledÆGIS. The code is publicly available3. Figure 7, provides
an overview of the architecture of ÆGIS and highlights its main
components.ÆGIS is implemented on top of Trinity4, an Ethereum
client implemented in Python.
5.1 Ethereum Client
EVM. We modified the EVM of Trinity such that it keeps track
of all the executed instructions and their states at runtime, in the
form of an ordered list. We refer to this list as the execution trace.
Each record in this list contains the executed opcode, the value
of the program counter, the depth of the call stack, the address of
the contract that is being executed, and finally, all the values that
were stored on the stack and in memory. This list is passed to the
interpreter component of ÆGIS.
3https://github.com/christoftorres/Aegis
4https://trinity.ethereum.org/
Interpreter. The interpreter loops through the list of executed
instructions and passes the relevant instructions to the control flow
and data flow extractor components. It is also responsible for sig-
nalling the EVM a revert in case the execution trace matches an
attack pattern.
Control Flow Extractor. The control flow extractor is responsible
for inferring control flow information. We do so by dynamically
building a call tree from the instructions received by the interpreter.
A control flow relation is reported if there exists a path along the
call tree, from the source instruction to the destination instruction
defined in a given pattern. Thus, control flow relations represent
call dependencies between two instructions.
Data Flow Extractor. The data flow extractor is responsible for
collecting data flow information. We track the flow of data be-
tween instructions by using dynamic taint analysis. Taint is intro-
duced whenever we come across a source instruction and checked
whenever we come across a destination instruction. Source and
destination instructions are defined by a given pattern. Taint propa-
gation follows the semantics of the EVM [41] across stack, memory
and storage. We perform byte-level precision tainting. Taint that
is stored across stack and memory is volatile, meaning that it is
cleared across transactions. Taint that is stored across storage is
persistent, meaning that it remains in storage across transactions.
This allows us to perform inter-transactional taint analysis. A data
flow relation is given if taint flows from a source instruction into a
destination instruction.
Pattern Parser. The pattern parser is responsible for extracting
and parsing the patterns from the voting smart contract. We imple-
mented our pattern language using textX 5, a Python framework
providing a meta-language for building DSLs.
5.2 ÆGIS Smart Contract
The ÆGIS smart contract ensures proper curation of the list of
active patterns. We implemented our smart contract in Solidity.
As previously mentioned, patterns are accepted or removed via
a voting mechanism. The contract holds all proposed additions
and removals of patterns and allows a vote on them within a set
time window. The duration can be configured and updated by the
contract owner. Proposals are open to the public and anyone can
propose an addition to or removal from the list of patterns.
Fairness. Votes should remain secret until all eligible voters have
had sufficient opportunity to vote. Therefore, two time windows
are employed. The first window is for sending a commitment that
includes a deposit. The second window is for revealing a vote in-
cluding the return of the committed deposits. The two windows
are illustrated in Figure 8. In the figure, tp represents the point in
time when a pattern is proposed and marks the start of the commit
window. tc marks the end of the commit window and the start of
the reveal window. Lastly, tr marks the end of the reveal window
and the time when the pattern list is updated in case of a positive
vote outcome. A commitment is a hash of the vote ID, the voter’s
5https://github.com/textX/textX
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vote and a nonce. The vote ID is a hash of the proposed pattern
and identifies the pattern that is being voted on. The voter’s vote is
encoded as a boolean. The nonce ensures that commitments cannot
be replayed. The smart contract records these commitments, which
must be sent with the predefined deposit and within the predefined
time window. During the commitment phase no one knows how
anyone else has voted on a given pattern, and so cannot be swayed
by the decisions of others. However, the process should ultimately
be transparent to both voters and non-voters to foster trust in the
system. As such, during the second window, the reveal window, all
voters reveal how they have voted. They must reveal their vote in
order to get their deposit back. No commits may be made once the
reveal period has started.
timetrtctp
commit window reveal window
Figure 8: Timeline of the two voting stages.
Tallying. The voting ends either when more than 50% (50%+1 vote)
of the total number of votes reaches either accept or reject, or when
the time window for revealing expires with less than 50% having
been reached. In case the voting has ended but the reveal window
has not yet passed, any remaining voters are still eligible to reveal
their vote, such that their deposit can be returned. The reveal period
is bounded so that patterns are accepted or rejected in a practical
amount of time. In the event of a successful vote, the pattern to
which the vote pertains is added to or removed from the record held
by the contract, according to the proposal. If a vote is unsuccessful,
i.e. no majority voted for the proposal, the record of patterns is not
changed.
Actors. There are three types of actors: the proposers that submit
proposals to add or remove patterns, the voters that vote on pro-
posals, and the admins that govern the list of eligible voters as well
as the parameters of the smart contract (e.g. deposit, commit and
reveal windows, etc.). TheÆGIS smart contract allows every user
on the blockchain to become a proposer by submitting a proposal.
Voters then vote on the proposals by first committing their vote
and at a later stage revealing it. Not every user is an eligible voter.
Voters are only those users whose account address is stored in the
list of eligible voters maintained by the smart contract. Admins
may update the list of eligible voters. They oversee the proper cu-
ration of the smart contract and act as a governing body. Admins
are agreed upon off-chain and are represented by a multi-signature
wallet. A multi-signature wallet is an account address which only
performs actions if a group of users give their consent in form of a
signature.
Data Structures. The smart contract consists of several functions
and data structures that allow for the voting process to take place.
We make use of a number of modifiers, which act as checks carried
out before specific functions are executed. We use these to check
that: 1) a voter is eligible, 2) a vote is in progress, 3) a reveal is
in progress and 4) the associated vote has ended. We use a struct
to hold the details of each vote, these include the patternID, the
proposed pattern and the startBlock. These values enable us to
record the details needed to check when a vote ends, check that
the same pattern has not already been proposed, and count the
number of votes. The struct is used in conjunction with a mapping,
which maps a 32 bytes value to the details of each vote. The 32
bytes value represents the voteID of each vote, created by hashing
unique vote information. A constructor is used to define, at contract
launch, the value of the necessary deposit and the time windows
during which voters can commit or reveal. The former is given in
ether, while the latter are given in number of blocks. The deposit is
used to ensure that those who committed a vote also reveal their
vote. These values can be changed later using the contract’s admin
functions.
Functionality. The public functions for the voting process are:
addProposal, removeProposal, commitToVote and revealVote.
Both proposal functions first check if a vote with the same ID
already exists, and if not create a new instance of voting details via
the mapping. Next, the commitToVote function can be used inside
the defined number of blocks to submit a unique hash of an eligible
voter’s vote. This function makes use of the canVote modifier to
protect access. The voter’s commitment and vote hash are stored
only if the correct deposit amount was sent to the function. Once the
vote stage has ended the reveal stage begins. During this window the
revealVote function, protected by the canVotemodifier, processes
vote revelations and returns deposits. The function checks that
the stored hash matches the hash calculated from the parameters
passed to it, and if so, returns the voter’s deposit and records the
vote. Lastly, it calls an internal function which tallies the votes and
adds or removes the pattern if either the for or against vote has
reached over 50%. In this way the vote is self tallying. The patterns
are ultimately stored in an array that can be iterated over to ensure
each node has the full set. Finally, the contract also has two admin
functions: transferOwnership, changeVotingWindows. Both of
these are protected by the isOwnermodifier. The former allows the
current owning address to transfer control of the contract to a new
address. The latter allows the commit and reveal windows to be
changed as well as the amount required as a voting deposit.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness and correctness of
ÆGIS, by conducting two experiments. In the first experiment we
compare the effectiveness of ÆGIS to two state-of-the-art reen-
trancy detection tools: ECFChecker [12] and Sereum [31]. In the
second experiment we perform a large-scale analysis and measure
the correctness as well as the performance of ÆGIS across the first
4.5 million blocks of the Ethereum blockchain.
6.1 Comparison to Reentrancy Detection Tools
By analyzing transactions sent to contracts, Rodler et al.’s tool
Sereum flagged 16 contracts as victims of reentrancy attacks. How-
ever, after manual investigation the authors found that only 2 out of
the 16 contracts have actually become victims to reentrancy attacks.
We decided to analyze these 16 contracts and see if we face the same
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Table 1: Comparison between Sereum andÆGIS on the effectiveness of detecting reentrancy attacks.
Smart Contract Reentrancy Type EC
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VulnBankNoLock
Same-Function TP TP TP
Cross-Function FN TP TP
VulnBankBuggyLock
Same-Function TN FP TN
Cross-Function FN TP TP
VulnBankSecureLock
Same-Function TN FP TN
Cross-Function TN FP TN
Table 2: Comparison between ECFChecker, Sereum and
ÆGIS on the effectiveness of detecting same-function and
cross-function reentrancy attacks with manually intro-
duced locks.
challenges in classifying these contracts correctly. We contacted
the authors of Sereum and obtained the list of contract addresses.
Afterwards, we ran ÆGIS on all transactions related to the con-
tract addresses, up to block number 4,500,0006. Table 1 summarizes
our results and provides a comparison to the results obtained by
Sereum. From Table 1, we can observe thatÆGIS successfully de-
tects transactions related to the DAO contract and the DSEthToken
contract, as reentrancy attacks. Moreover,ÆGIS correctly flags the
remaining 14 contracts as not vulnerable. Hence, in contrast to
Sereum, ÆGIS produces no false positives on these 16 contracts.
After analyzing the false positives produced by Sereum, we con-
clude thatÆGIS does not produce the same false positives because
first,ÆGIS does not use taint analysis in its pattern and therefore
does not face issues of over-tainting, and secondly, it does not make
use of dynamic write locks to detect reentrancy.
6.1.1 Reentrancy with Locks. Besides evaluating Sereum on the
set of 16 real-world smart contracts, Rodler et al. also compared
Sereum to ECFChecker, using self-crafted smart contracts as a
benchmark [30]. The goal of this benchmark is to provide means
to investigate the quality of reentrancy detection tools. The bench-
mark consists of three functionally equivalent contracts, except
that the first contract does not employ any locking mechanism
6This is the maximum block number analyzed by the authors of Sereum.
to guard the reentry of functions (VulnBankNoLock), the second
contract employs partial implementation of a locking mechanism
(VulnBankBuggyLock), and the third contract employs a full im-
plementation of a locking mechanism (VulnBankSecureLock). As a
result, the first contract is vulnerable to same-function reentrancy
as well as cross-function reentrancy. The second contract is vulner-
able to cross-function reentrancy, but not to same-function reen-
trancy. Finally, the third contract is safe regarding both types of
reentrancy. We deployed these three contracts on the Ethereum test
network called Ropsten and ran the three contracts againstÆGIS.
Table 2 contains our results and comparesÆGIS to ECFChecker
and Sereum. We can see that ECFChecker has difficulties in detect-
ing cross-function reentrancy, whereas Sereum has difficulties in
distinguishing between reentrancy and manually introduced locks.
This is probably due to the locking mechanism exhibiting exactly
the same pattern as a reentrancy attack and Sereum being unable
to differentiate between these two. We found thatÆGIS correctly
classifies every contract as either vulnerable or not vulnerable in
all the test cases.
6.1.2 Unconditional Reentrancy. Calls that send ether are usually
protected by a check in the form of an if, require, or assert.
Reentrancy attacks typically try to bypass these checks. However,
it is possible to write a contract, which does not perform any check
before sending ether. Rodler et al. present an example of such a vul-
nerability and name it unconditional reentrancy (see Appendix B).
Moreover, they also find an example of such a contract deployed on
the Ethereum blockchain7. When Sereumwas published, it was not
able to detect this type of reentrancy since the authors assumed that
every call that may lead to a reentrancy is guarded by a condition.
However, the authors claim to have fixed this issue by extending
Sereum to tracking data flows from storage to the parameters of
calls. We cannot verify this since the source code of Sereum is not
publicly available. We runÆGIS on both examples, the manually
crafted example by Rodler et al. and the contract deployed on the
Ethereum blockchain.ÆGIS correctly identifies the unconditional
reentrancy contained in both examples without modifying the ex-
isting patterns. This is as expected, since in contrast to Sereum’s
initial way to detect reentrancy,ÆGIS’s reentrancy patterns do not
rely on the detection of conditions (i.e. JUMPI) to detect reentrancy.
7https://etherscan.io/address/0xb7c5c5aa4d42967efe906e1b66cb8df9cebf04f7
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Vulnerability Contracts Transactions
Same-Function Reentrancy 7 822
Cross-Function Reentrancy 5 695
Delegated Reentrancy 0 0
Create-Based Reentrancy 0 0
Parity Wallet Hack 1 3 80
Parity Wallet Hack 2 236 236
Total Unique 248 1118
Table 3: Number of vulnerable contracts detected byÆGIS.
6.2 Large-Scale Blockchain Analysis
In this experiment we analyse the first 4.5 million blocks of the
Ethereum blockchain and compare our findings to those of Rodler
et al. We started by scanning the Ethereum blockchain for smart
contracts that have been deployed until block 4,500,000. We found
675,444 successfully deployed contracts. The deployment times-
tamps of the found contracts range from August 7, 2015 to Novem-
ber 6, 2017. Next, we replayed the execution history of these 675,444
contracts. As part of the scanning we found that only 12 contracts
in our dataset have more than 10.000 transactions. Therefore, to
reduce the execution time, we decided to limit our analysis to the
first 10.000 transactions of each contract. In addition, similar to
Rodler et al., we tried our best to skip those transactions which
were involved in denial-of-service attacks as they would result in
high execution times8.
We ranÆGIS on our set of 675,444 contracts using a 6-core Intel
Core i7-8700 CPU @ 3.20GHz and 64 GB RAM. Our tool took on
average 108 milliseconds to analyse a transaction, with a median of
24 milliseconds per transaction. All in all, we re-executed 4,960,424
transactions with an average of 8 transactions per contract. Table 3
summarizes our results. ÆGIS found a total of 1,118 malicious
transactions and 248 unique contacts that have been exploited
through either a reentrancy or an access control vulnerability. More
specifically, ÆGIS found that 7 contracts have become victim to
same-function reentrancy, 5 contracts to cross-function reentrancy,
3 contracts to the first Parity wallet hack and 236 contracts to the
second Parity wallet hack. Similar to the results of Rodler et al.,
we did not find any contracts to have become victim to delegated
reentrancy or create-based reentrancy. We validated all our results
by manually analyzing the source code (whenever it was publicly
available) and/or the execution traces of the flagged contracts. Our
validation did not reveal any false positives.
Table 4 lists all the contract addresses thatÆGIS detected to have
become victim of a same-function reentrancy attack. The block
range defines the block heights whereÆGIS detected the malicious
transactions. The first and second contract addresses contained
in Table 4 are the same as reported by Sereum, and belong to the
DSEthToken and DAO contract, respectively. The rows highlighted
in gray mark 5 contracts that have been flagged byÆGIS but not by
Sereum. After investigating the transactions of these 5 contracts, we
find that the contract addresses 0x26b8af052895080148dabbc1007
8https://tinyurl.com/rvlvues
b3045f023916e and 0xbf78025535c98f4c605fbe9eaf672999abf
19dc1 became victim to same-function reentrancy, but seem to be
contracts that have been deployed with the purpose of studying
the DAO hack. However, the three other contract addresses seem
to be true victims of reentrancy attacks.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss alternatives to determine eligible voters,
highlight some of the current limitations as well as future research
directions for this work.
7.1 Determining Eligible Voters
The introduction of new patterns inÆGIS depends on achieving
consensus in a predetermined group of voters. Although it may
intuitively make sense to let miners vote, they are not necessarily
a good fit. Their interests may differ from those of smart contract
users. For example, depending on a pattern’s complexity, it might
introduce an overhead in terms of execution time. Miners are then
incentivized to prefer simpler patterns that are evaluated quicker,
while smart contract users would prefer more secure patterns.
Alternatively, a group of trusted security experts could act as
eligible voters9. Security experts are (by definition) able to properly
evaluate patterns and have the interest in doing so. The voting
contract is then controlled by a group of trusted experts who are
decided upon off-chain by a group of admins. For transparency,
the identity of admins and experts would be exposed to the public
by mapping every identity to an Ethereum account. Changes to
the list of voters, the deposit, or the commit and reveal windows
are then visible to anyone via the blockchain. Through this setup,
security experts would be able to organise themselves with the voter
list being comprised of a curated group of knowledgeable people.
Such groups already exist in reality, for example, the members
of the Smart Contract Weakness Classification registry (SWC)10,
and would be a good fit for our system. Moreover, misbehaving
or unresponsive experts could be easily removed by the group of
admins. Although this approach allows for scalability and control,
it has the disadvantage of introducing managing third-parties. That
runs counter to the decentralised concept of Ethereum.
9Somewhat similar to how CVEs are handled.
10https://smartcontractsecurity.github.io/SWC-registry/
Contract Address Block Range
0xd654bdd32fc99471455e86c2e7f7d7b6437e9179 1680024 - 1680238
0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413 1718497 - 2106624
0xf01fe1a15673a5209c94121c45e2121fe2903416 1743596 - 1743673
0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490 1881284 - 1881284
0x59752433dbe28f5aa59b479958689d353b3dee08 3160801 - 3160801
0xbf78025535c98f4c605fbe9eaf672999abf19dc1 3694969 - 3695510
0x26b8af052895080148dabbc1007b3045f023916e 4108700 - 4108700
Table 4: Same-function reentrancy vulnerable contracts de-
tected by ÆGIS. Contracts highlighted in gray have only
been detected byÆGIS and not by Sereum.
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Alternatively, there is also an option to select voters, while pre-
serving the decentralised concept of Ethereum. This is to remove
the role of admins altogether, and instead follow a self-organizing
strategy, similar to Proof-of-Stake. In this case, everyone is allowed
to become a voter through the purchase of (not prohibitively priced)
voting power. This could be achieved by depositing a fixed amount
of ether into the voting smart contract as a form of collateral.
7.2 Adoption and Participation Incentives
The deployment of ÆGIS would require a modification of the
Ethereum consensus protocol, which would require existing Ether-
eum clients to be updated. This could be easily achieved though
a major release by including this one-time modification as part
of a scheduled hardfork. Another issue concerns the incentives to
propose and vote on patterns. While prestige or a feeling of con-
tributing to the security of Ethereum may be sufficient for some,
more incentives may be needed to ensure that the protective capa-
bilities of ÆGIS are used to the full extent. A monetary incentive
could address this. That is,ÆGIS could be extended with automat-
ically paid rewards. In other words, ÆGIS could be extended to
enable bug bounties [6].ÆGIS’s smart contract could be modified
such that, owners of smart contracts can register their contract ad-
dress by sending a transaction toÆGIS’s voting smart contract and
deposit a bounty in the form of ether. Then, proposers of patterns
would be rewarded automatically with the bounty byÆGIS’s voting
smart contract, if their proposed pattern is accepted by the group
of voters. Moreover, owners could simply replenish the bounty for
their contract by making new deposits toÆGIS’s smart contract.
7.3 Limitations and Future Work
A current limitation of our tool is that proposed attack patterns are
submitted in plain text to the smart contract. Potential attackers can
view the patterns and use them to find vulnerable smart contracts.
To mitigate this, we propose to make use of encryption such that
only the voters would be able to view the patterns. However, this
would break the current capability of the smart contract being self-
tallying. Designing an encrypted and practical self-tallying solution
is left for future work. Finally, we intend to make use of parallel
execution inside the extractors and the checking of patterns in
order to improve the time required to analyse transactions.
8 CONCLUSION
Although academia proposed a number of tools to detect vulnera-
bilities in smart contracts, they all fail to protect already deployed
vulnerable smart contracts. One of the proposed solutions is to
modify the Ethereum clients in order to detect and revert transac-
tions that try to exploit vulnerable smart contracts. However, these
solutions require all the Ethereum clients to be modified every time
a new type of vulnerability is discovered. In this work, we intro-
duced ÆGIS, a system that detects and reverts attacks via attack
patterns. These patterns describe malicious control and data flows
through the use of a novel domain-specific language. In addition,
we presented a novel mechanism for security updates that allows
these attack patterns to be updated quickly and transparently via
the blockchain, by using a smart contract as means of storing them.
Finally, we comparedÆGIS to two current state-of-the-art online
reentrancy detection tools. Our results show thatÆGIS not only
detects more attacks, but also has no false positives as compared to
current state-of-the-art.
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A COMPLETE LIST OFÆGIS’S ATTACK
PATTERNS
Table 5 provides a complete list of vulnerabilities as well as their
respective attack patterns thatÆGIS is currently capable to detect.
B UNCONDITIONAL REENTRANCY
EXAMPLE
Figure 9 shows an example of a smart contract with an uncondi-
tional reentrancy. In this example an attacker first deposits a small
amount of ether and then uses a reentrancy attack in order to drain
all the ether that every single user has deposited.
1 contract VulnBank {
2 mapping (address => uint) public userBalances;
3
4 function deposit () public payable {
5 userBalances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
6 }
7
8 function withdrawAll () public {
9 uint amountToWithdraw = userBalances[msg.sender ];
10 msg.sender.call.value(amountToWithdraw)("");
11 userBalances[msg.sender] = 0;
12 }
13 }
Figure 9: Example of a contract that is vulnerable to uncon-
ditional reentrancy [30].
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Vulnerability Attack Pattern
Same-Function
Reentrancy
(opcode = CALL) ⇒ (opcode = CALL) where (src.stack (1) = dst.stack (1)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.pc = dst.pc) →
(opcode = SSTORE) → (opcode = SSTORE) where (src.stack (0) = dst.stack (0)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.depth > dst.depth)
Cross-Function
Reentrancy
(opcode = CALL) ⇒ (opcode = CALL) where
(src.stack (1) = dst.stack (1)) ∧ (src.address = dst.address) ∧
(src.memory(src.stack (3), src.stack (4)) , dst.memory(dst.stack (3), dst.stack (4))) →
(opcode = SSTORE) → (opcode = SSTORE) where (src.stack (0) = dst.stack (0)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.depth > dst.depth)
Delegated
Reentrancy
(opcode = DELEGATECALL) ⇒ (opcode = DELEGATECALL) where (src.stack (1) = dst.stack (1)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.pc = dst.pc) →
(opcode = SSTORE) → (opcode = SSTORE) where (src.stack (0) = dst.stack (0)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.depth > dst.depth)
(opcode = CALLCODE) ⇒ (opcode = CALLCODE) where (src.stack (1) = dst.stack (1)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.pc = dst.pc) →
(opcode = SSTORE) → (opcode = SSTORE) where (src.stack (0) = dst.stack (0)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.depth > dst.depth)
Create-Based
Reentrancy
(opcode = CREATE) ⇒ (opcode = CREATE) where (src.stack (1) = dst.stack (1)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.pc = dst.pc) →
(opcode = SSTORE) → (opcode = SSTORE) where (src.stack (0) = dst.stack (0)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.depth > dst.depth)
Parity Wallet
Hack 1
(opcode = DELEGATECALL) ⇒ (opcode = CALLDATACOPY) { (opcode = SSTORE) { (opcode = JUMPI) where
(src.transaction.hash , dst.transaction.hash) →
(( opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { (opcode = CALL)) where
(dst.stack (2) > 0)
Parity Wallet
Hack 2
(opcode = CALLDATACOPY) { (opcode = SSTORE) { (opcode = JUMPI) where
(src.transaction.hash , dst.transaction.hash) →
(( opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { (opcode = SELFDESTRUCT))
Integer Overflow
(Addition)
(opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { (opcode = ADD) where
((dst.stack (0) + dst.stack (1)) , dst.stack.result) { (opcode = CALL)
Integer Overflow
(Multiplication)
(opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { (opcode = MUL) where
((dst.stack (0) * dst.stack (1)) , dst.stack.result) { (opcode = CALL)
Integer Underflow (opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { (opcode = SUB) where
((dst.stack (0) - dst.stack (1)) , dst.stack.result) { (opcode = CALL)
Timestamp
Dependence (opcode = TIMESTAMP) { (opcode = JUMPI) → (opcode = CALL) where (dst.stack (2) > 0)
Transaction
Order Dependency
(opcode = SSTORE) { (opcode = SLOAD) where
(src.block.number = dst.block.number) ∧ (src.transaction.from , dst.transaction.from)
Table 5: List of vulnerabilities and their respective attack patterns.
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